Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-36, Postflight Edition by Hill, William C. & Finkel, Seymour I.
,,.I, .-' - ;'-/t -
t ¢"
-f;,l 7
MISSION SAFETY EVALUATION
REPORT FOR STS-36
Postflight Edition: June 15, 1990
(x_ASA-[_-|O71R0) _[3SI_N DAF_TY _VaLI,JATI_J,'_
_EPgRT _0_ ST5-36, POSTrLI_HI EnITION
(_JASA) I_l p CSCL 2ZA
__ Division
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
National Aeronautics_d Space Administration
VJ.U.... "
Washl__DC 20546
7....
Unclas
G3/t? 001756_
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19920014001 2020-03-17T11:48:13+00:00Z

MISSION SAFETY EVALUATION
REPORT FOR STS-36
Postflight Edition: June 15, 1990
Safety Division
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546

MISSION SAFETY EVALUATION
REPORT FOR STS-36
Postflight Edition: June 15, 1990
Prepared by:
William C. Hill
Space Shuttle Safety Project
Vitro Corporation
Concur by:
Concur by:
Approved by:
Seymour I. Finkel
Manager, Space Shuttle Safety Project
Vitro Corporation
Jerry F. Moore, PE
Manager, Space Shuttle Safety Program
Safety Division
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Charles W. Mertz /
Director __s
Safety Division
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
STS-36 Postflight Edition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After 5 attempts, including 3 complete tanking operations, Atlantis was launched
from Kennedy Space Center Launch Pad 39A at 2:50 a.m. Eastern Standard Time
(EST), February 28, 1990. No technical problems occurred during the countdown. Rain
showers moved into the area shortly after the opening of the launch window and
remained in the area until shortly after 2 a.m. The ceiling over the Return-To-Launch
Site runway began to dissipate at approximately 2:30 a.m., and the countdown clock,
held at the T-9 minute mark, was restarted at 2:40 a.m. After a brief hold at T-5
minutes to double-check Return-To-Launch Site and TransAtlantic Abort Landing Site
weather, Atlantis lifted off Pad 39A at 2:50 a.m. EST.
Atlantis touched down on Edwards Air Force Base lakebed runway 23 at
approximately 10:09 a.m. Pacific Standard Time, March 4, 1990. Exterior review of
Atlantis found it to be in excellent shape. Sixty-two debris hits on tiles were recorded,
14 greater than 1 inch. None will require tile replacement. Orbiter Auxiliary Power
Unit #1 anomalies were the only problems of major concern.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ) and the Space Shuttle Program Manager prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Program Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety
risk factors impacting STS-36 flight were also documented prior to the STS-36 Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and prior to the STS-36 Launch Minus Two
Day Review (L-2 Edition). This final postflight edition evaluates performance against
safety risk factors identified in previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ) and the Space Shuttle Program Manager with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to
the Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-36 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have impact on this flight, and factors
that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE will be updated subsequent to the mission to
add items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary mission description, including launch data,
crew size, mission duration, launch and landing sites, and other
mission-related information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-36 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-36
flight.
Section 4 Contains a list of safety risk factors that are considered
resolved for STS-36.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-32 mission.
Section 6 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-34
mission.
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-36
mission. Those STS-36 IFAs which are considered to represent
safety risks will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space
Shuttle flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-36 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of STS-36 Mission
After 5 attempts, including 3 complete tanking operations, Atlantis was launched
from Pad 39A at 2:50 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), February 28, 1990. The first
two opportunities were scrubbed due to poor weather conditions and a minor upper
respiratory infection that kept Commander Creighton from being cleared for flight.
Conditions improved, and a third attempt was made on February 25. Tanking and
launch preparations went relatively smooth encountering only minor problems. Shortly
after resuming the countdown at T-5 minutes, the Superintendent for Range Safety
announced that Cyber B, one of two Range Safety computers, was down. The
countdown clock was halted at the T-31 second mark in an effort to allow time for
Cyber B to return to operational status. Several minutes into the hold, the Space
Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Oxygen temperature rose above the Launch Commit
Criteria (LCC) limit. Launch Director, Bob Sieck, determined that a recycle attempt
could not be accomplished prior to the end of the launch window and scrubbed the
launch.
The fourth attempt to launch Atlantis was made on February 26, 1990. Tanking
and launch preparations again went smoothly; however, surface winds at Pad 39A were
periodically gusting above the 24-knot LCC limit. The countdown clock was held at the
T-9 minute mark in the hope that the high wind condition would subside. During this
hold, a cloud deck beneath the 5,000-foot LCC limit moved in and was predicted to
remain over Kennedy Space Center for the remainder of the launch window. At
approximately 2:30 a.m., the Launch Director scrubbed the launch and ordered a
48-hour launch turnaround.
February 28, 1990, between 12 midnight and 4 a.m. was the fifth target window for
the launch of Atlantis. No technical problems occurred during the countdown. Rain
showers moved into the area shortly after the opening of the launch window and
remained in the area until shortly after 2 a.m. The ceiling over the Return-To-Launch
Site runway began to dissipate at approximately 2:30 a.m., and the countdown clock,
held at the T-9 minute mark, was restarted at 2:40 a.m. After a brief hold at T-5
minutes to double check Return-To-Launch Site and Transatlantic Abort Landing Site
weather, Atlantis lifted off Pad 39A at 2:50 a.m. EST.
Ascent, through Solid Rocket Booster separation, Main Engine Cutoff, and
External Tank separation went well. Nothing unusual was seen during the review of the
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ascent films. An anomalywith hydraulic system#1 pressure was the only item of
concern. For the first time in 4 launches, there was no report of holddown post stud
hangup or broaching. The A-286 "weak link" modification to the Debris Containment
System held at least 96% of the debris on 7 of 8 holddown posts; approximately 64%
was contained in the eighth.
Approximately 2 hours into the flight, the Atlantis crew was given the go ahead to
continue their classified Department of Defense mission. The crew and vehicle were
reported to be healthy throughout the remainder of the mission. Two Reaction Control
System thrusters failed off and were deselected by Redundancy Management. One to 2
cups of water were found during on-orbit inspection of the humidity separators. Water
escape from the separators was not as bad as that experienced on STS-32/OV-102;
however, further investigation of the water escape problem is underway.
Atlantis landed at approximately 10:09 a.m. Pacific Standard Time (PST) on
Edwards Air Force Base Runway 23 (lakebed), on March 4, 1990. Exterior review of
Atlantis found it to be in excellent shape. Sixty-two debris hits on tiles were recorded,
14 greater than 1 inch. None will require tile replacement. Hydraulic fluid was found
leaking from the engine #1 heat shield. In addition to recorded pressure anomalies
during ascent, hydraulic system #1 pressure was erratic during descent. Closer
inspection found that the entire aft compartment had been sprayed with hydraulic fluid.
Investigation into the source of the leak found a 1/2-inch cut in the stainless steel braid
of a flexible feedline. This feedline runs between the Auxiliary Power Unit #1 pump
and filter package. Initial indications were that the cut was the result of a line burst
versus an external cut. The flex hose was removed for further analysis. Hydraulic
System # 1 fluid reservoir was found dry, indicating that nearly 5 gallons of hydraulic
fluid was lost. Removal of hydraulic fluid from the aft compartment has been
completed. Failure analysis determined that this was not a generic flex hose problem;
it was isolated to a single lot of flex hose teflon liner.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: February 28, 1990
• Launch Time: 2:50 a.m. EST
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Classified
• Alternate TAL Site: Classified
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Lakebed
• Landing Date: March 4, 1990
• Landing Time: 10:09 a.m. PST
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: Classified
• Altitude: Classified
• Orbiter: OV-104 (6)Atlantis
• SSMEs: (1) #2019, (2) #2030, (3) #2027
• ET: ET-33
• SRBs: BI-036
• SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #9
• MLP: MLP #1
2-3 STS-36 Postflight Edition
ENGINE #2019 #2030 #2027
POWERHEAD #2020 #2107 # 4004
MCC* #2023 #2026 #2024
NOZZLE #2024 #4013 #2027
CONTROLLER F4 F17 F23
FASCOS* #23 #26 #20
HPFTP* #6008 #6003 #4010
LPFTP* #2022R1 #2027 #4005
HPOTP" #4406R3 #2324R5 #2225R2
LPOTP* #2025R1 #2216 #4302
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Payload Data
The payload is classified.
NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ) did not
participate in the Safety Reviews for the DoD payloads. NASA Headquarters Safety
Division, Code QS, did participate in review of the Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
(ICHR) by the System Safety Review Panel (SSRP).
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-36 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-36 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-36 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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Section 4:
Orbiter 14
ITEM
Resolved Safety Risk Factors
Reaction Control System
(RCS) thruster weld issue.
COMMENT
Two RCS thrusters failed during STS-36.
Both anomalies (IFA No. STS-36-04 and
STS-36-12) were attributed to
contamination of the oxidizer poppet
valve that formed as a direct result of
water intrusion prior to launch. The
thruster chamber-to-injector weld
concern did not a play role in either
anomaly.
Efforts are in progress to expedite the
procurement of the universal throat plug
that is designed to eliminate the
potential for water intrusion into RCS
thrusters.
SSME 5 Bluing found on nozzle of
engine #2107, STS-33.
Postflight inspection of engine #2027,
nozzle #2027, found similar bluing (IFA
NO. STS-36-I-01). Hardness tests found
no annealing in the area of discoloration
on this nozzle. Both instances of bluing
have been attributed to steep reentry
profiles.
Section 5:
Orbiter 4
Orbiter 5
STS-34 Inflight Anomalies
Humidity separator "B"
(and "A") water bypass.
(IFA No. STS-32-07A and
STS-32-07B)
The crew reported finding approximately
2 cups of free water outside of humidity
separator "A" (IFA No. STS-36-11).
Postflight vendor analysis found
contamination in the humidity separator
pitot tube inlet, partially blocking it.
Contamination had not been
experienced in this location in any
humidity separator to date.
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Section6:
Orbiter 2
ITEM
STS-34 Inflight Anomalies.
Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) # 1 fault to high
speed. (IFA No.
STS-34-04)
COMMENT
There were no APU controller failures
during STS-36. There was, however, an
APU #1 flex hose leak (IFA No.
STS-36-08) and a hydraulic system
depressurization anomaly (IFA No.
STS-36-17) on STS-36. There is no
indication that these anomalies are
related.
3-3 STS-36 Postflight Edition

SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-36 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a list of the safety risk factors that were considered resolved
for STS-36. These items have been reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to resolution was based on findings resulting
from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) reviews (or other special panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety
assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and
tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-36 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR
INTEGRATION
1 Unitrode diode, Part Number IN4148, Lot Date Code 8339, failures.
PAGE
4-5
ORBITER
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Old bolts reinstalled instead of new improved bolts during Gaseous
Hydrogen and Gaseous Oxygen disconnect modification kit
installation.
Forward Power Control Assembly #1 Remote Power Controller #1
fails voltage drop test during vehicle checkout.
Safety did not concur with approved exceptions to Airframe and Mid-
Fuselage Wing Carry-Through inspections.
Philadelphia Insulated Wire Company alert.
Night landing crosswind limit revised without Safety concurrence.
OV-104 right-hand inboard elevon actuator.
OV-104 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly.
Elevon tile improperly bonded.
Large voids found across fuel cell flowmeter braze joints.
OV-104 Auxiliary Power Unit #1 turbine wheel limited-life issue.
OV-104 has 4 Multiplexer-Demultiplexers that may contain Erie
capacitors which are prone to failure.
Fabrication weld defects in Orbiter aft structure.
OV-104/STS-36 right Orbital Maneuvering System engine gimbal
profile anomaly.
Reaction Control System thruster weld issue.
Small spark observed during prelaunch flight crew suit operations.
4-6
4-6
4-7
4-8
4-8
4-9
4-9
4-10
4-11
4-13
4-14
4-16
4-16
4-18
4-23
SSME
1
2
3
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Serial Number 2225R2 on engine
#2027 was the first to be installed on a flight engine without
teardown and refurbishment.
Nozzle protrusions on engine #2027 were greater than the established
limit.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump #6008, engine #2019, exhibited
turbine-end liftoff seal leakage.
4-25
4-25
4-26
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-36 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
_.__ME
4
5
6
7
8
Space Shuttle Main Engine High-Pressure Fuel duct weld issue.
Bluing found on nozzle of STS-33 engine #2107.
Heat-damaged nozzle steerhorn insulators on engines #2022 and
#2028 indicated potential for cold wall leaks.
Eccentric ring fold-over found on STS-32 engine #2028.
Broken Chamber Coolant Valve thrust bearing retainers found on
engines #2206 and #0209.
Preburner purge pressure redline exceedance during engine #0213
testing at Stennis Space Center.
PAGE
4-28
4-30
4-30
4-32
4-32
4-34
SRB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Left Solid Rocket Booster Rate Gyro Assembly #1 yaw output
failure.
Thermal curtain bracket installation.
Elimination of Solid Rocket Booster Holddown Post Debris
Containment System frangible link.
Thrust Vector Control fuel filter bowl drain cap hazard upgrade.
Potential criticality 1 failure mode related to Solid Rocket Beacon
Tracking System.
Instrument and Electronics Assembly battery temperature sensor
anomaly.
STS-36 Solid Rocket Booster Fuel Supply Module pressure drop.
Improper helicoils used in Solid Rocket Booster floor plate.
4-35
4-35
4-36
4-37
4-38
4-39
4-40
4-41
SRM
1
2
3
4
Standard-weight, forward cylinder Serial Number 37 thin spot.
Nozzle joint #5 removal with a new torque tool.
STS-31 nozzle internal joint leak test investigation.
Voids in the Solid Rocket Motor nozzle radial bonds between the
phenolic rings.
4-42
4-43
4-44
4-45
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-36 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
Solid Rocket Motor Ignition Initiator manufacturing anomalies.
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor igniter joint deflections.
PAGE
4-46
4-48
First flight of reworked External Tank Solid Rocket Booster fittings. 4-50
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SECTION 5
STS-32 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
OV-102/STS-32 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
-j.
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SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-32INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 lubrication oil outlet pressure high.
Right-hand Orbital Maneuvering System "no-back" device moved
during ascent.
Gaseous Oxygen Flow Control Valve # 2 opened sluggishly.
Humidity separator "B" water bypass.
Humidity separator "A" water bypass.
Flash Evaporator System topping duct "B" string heater failure.
Inertial Measurement Unit #1 was deselected by Redundancy
Management due to Y-axis transients.
Hydraulic systems #1 and #2 unloader valves exhibited anomalous
operation.
Water Spray Boilers #2 and #3 regulator pressure decaying slowly.
Avionics bay #3A smoke detector transient alarm and associated
lights.
Waste water dump line/nozzle blockage.
Water Spray Boiler #3 controller "A" overcooling.
Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen outboard fill and drain
relief valve leak.
Right-hand stop bolt was found slightly deformed on the STS-32
centering ring of the forward External Tank attach/separation
assembly.
Pilot seat down drive motor did not operate.
Backup Flight Computer General Purpose Computer errors -
Input/Output Terminal B.
PAGE
5-4
5-5
5-7
5-8
5-9
5-10
5-11
5-12
5-13
5-14
5-15
5-16
5-16
5-17
5-18
5-19
SSME
Main Combustion Chamber aft end debond found on engine #2022.
Gouges found in the Main Combustion Chamber throat area of
engines #2024 and #2028.
5-21
5-23
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SECTION 5 INDEX - CONTINUED
STS-32 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
SRB
1
2
3
Upper strut Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer cover partially
missing.
External Tank Attachment ring aft Instrument and Electronics
Assembly cover sooted.
Broken fastener found on STS-32 left-hand SRB upper strut fairing.
SRM
1
2
Right Solid Rocket Motor Safe and Arm gasket depression on
secondary seal.
Raised areas found on the igniter inner Gask-O-Seal.
PAGE
5-24
5-25
5-26
5-27
5-29
Review of the External Tank separation photos from STS-32 showed
4 Spray-On Foam Insulation divots in the bipod area.
5-31
KSC
1
MCC
Right-hand aft Integrated Electronic Assembly bent pins.
State vector uplink incident.
5-32
5-33
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SECTION 6
STS-34 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IF,as) arising from the STS-34
mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and
rationale are provided.
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SECTION 6 INDEX
STS-34 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Engine Interface Unit #3 momentary 60-1dlobit data stream loss.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 fault to high speed.
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer Flight-Critical Aft #1 Input/Output errors.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater "A"
inoperative.
Flash Evaporator System Hi-load inboard duct temperature low.
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 seal leak into drain bottle.
Right Orbital Maneuvering System engine cover heater system "B"
failed off.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 fuel pump heater "B" cycling high.
Cryogenic oxygen manifold #2 isolation valve did not close.
Right vent door #3 motor #1 operating on 2 phases.
External Tank/Orbiter Liquid Oxygen aft separation hole plugger
failed.
SSME
1 Main injector heat shield retainer ring segment failure on engine
#2029.
SRB
1 Right Solid Rocket Booster Holddown Post #2 broached and shoe
lifted from Mobile Launch Platform during liftoff.
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SECTION 7
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
OV-104/STS-36 mission.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
INTEGRATION
RISK
FACTOR
Engine #2027, nozzle #2027 bluing.
PAGE
7-4
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Fuel Cell #2 Alternating Current phase "A" inverter failure.
Liquid Hydrogen 17" disconnect "B" open indication intermittent.
Reaction Control System Thruster R3D failed off during External
Tank separation.
Right Reaction Control System manifold #1 oxidizer isolation valve
position indication intermittent.
Left Reaction Control System 3/4/5 "B" oxidizer tank isolation valve
open position indication intermittent.
Left Reaction Control System 1/2 oxidizer crossfeed valve closed
position indication intermittent.
Water Spray Boiler #2 vent system "A" heater failed.
STS-36 Auxiliary Power Unit #1 hydraulic flex hose leak anomaly.
Cathode Ray Tube #4 screen went blank.
Oxygen bleed orifice leak.
Free water found near humidity separator "A".
Thruster R4R failed off during pre-entry hot fire test.
Flash Evaporator System controller "A" shutdown.
STS-36 hydraulic system depressurization anomaly.
7-5
7-5
7-6
7-6
7-7
7-7
7-8
7-8
7-15
7-15
7-15
7-16
7-16
7-17
SRB
1
2
3
Left Solid Rocket Booster ordnance ring pin embedded in External
Tank Attach ring foam.
Left Solid Rocket Booster frustum Main Parachute Support System
restraint strap bolt missing a nut.
Safety wire missing from Gaseous Nitrogen purge line in right-hand
aft skirt.
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SECTION 7 INDEX - CONTINUED
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SRB
4
5
6
SRM
1
2
RISK
FACTOR
Left Solid Rocket Booster drogue parachute first stage reefing line
cutter failure.
Right and left Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attach ring found
with cable tie-wraps disengaged from electrical cable assemblies.
Right SRB frustum Marshall Trowellable Ablator No. 2 debonds.
Right Solid Rocket Motor igniter/forward dome boss interface surface
metal pitting and Gask-O-Seal damage.
Secondary O-ring damage to igniter plug.
PAGE
7-23
7-23
7-24
7-25
7-28
KSC
1
MCC
1
Missing washer on Debris Containment System Holddown Post #6.
Space Shuttle Main Engine post-powerdown hardware failure
indicated.
7-30
7-33
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AC
AFB
APS
APU
ATP
BFC
BFS
BITE
BOB
BSR
CA
CC
CCS
CCV
CPM
CR
CRES
CRT
DCS
DFRC
DoD
DR
ECP
EIU
EPDM
EPS
EST
ET
ETA
Alternating Current
Air Force Base
Aft Propulsion System
Auxiliary Power Unit
Acceptance Test Procedure
Backup Flight Computer
Backup Flight System
Built-In Test Equipment
Breakout Boxes
Bite Status Register
California
Cubic Centimeter
Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Chamber Coolant Valve
Cell Performance Monitor
Change Request
Corrosion Resistant Steel
Cathode Ray Tube
Debris Containment System
Dryden Flight Research Center
Department of Defense
Discrepancy Report
Engineering Change Proposal
Engine Interface Unit
Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
Electrical Power Systems
Eastern Standard Time
External Tank
External Tank Attachment
External Tank Attach
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (CONT.)
F
FA
FASCO
FC
FCHL
FCV
FD
FEC
FES
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FP
FPCA
FRI
FRR
FSM
ft
GFE
GG
GGVM
GH2
GN2
GO2
GOX
GPC
GSE
GSFC
n 2
HCF
HDP
HPF
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPU
HR
hr
Fahrenheit
Hight-Critical Aft
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Fuel Cell
Flight Control Hydraulics Laboratory
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Field Engineering Change
Flash Evaporator System
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
Forward Power Control Assembly
Flow Restriction Inhibiter
Flight Readiness Review
Fuel Supply Module
Feet
Government Furnished Equipment
Gas Generator
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Goddard Space Flight Center
Hydrogen
High-Cycle Fatigue
Holddown Post
High-Pressure Fuel
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Unit
Hazard Report
Hour
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (CONT.)
I/O
ICHR
IEA
IFA
IMU
in-lb
in/sec
in _
INCO
INTG
IOP
JSC
Kbit
KSC
L-2
lb
lbf
LCC
LCF
LDC
LH
LH2
LiOH
LO2
LOX
LPFTP
LPOTP
LPS
LRU
LSFR
LSOC
Input/Output
Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
Instrument and Electronics Assembly
Integrated Electronic Assembly
Inflight Anomaly
Inertial Measurement Unit
Inch-Pounds
Inches Per Second
Cubic Inch
Integrated Communications Officer
Integration
Input/Output Processor
Johnson Space Center
Kilobit
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Days (Review)
Pound
Pounds Force
Launch Commit Criteria
Low-Cycle Fatigue
Lot Date Code
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Lithium Hydroxide
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Process Sequencer
Line Replaceable Unit
Line Replacement Unit
Launch Site Flow Review
Lockheed Space Operations Company
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (CONT.)
MCC
MDM
ME
MECO
MEOP
min
MLP
MOC
MPS
MPSS
MRB
MSE
msec
MSFC
MTA-2
mV
N,O,
NASA
NSI
NSRS
02
OI
OMI
OMRS
OMRSD
OMS
OPF
OPO
OPOV
ORBI
OSMQ
OV
OZ
P/N
PASS
PDU
PLS
POR
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine
Main Engine Cutoff
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure
Minute
Mobile Launch Platform
Mission Operational Computer
Main Propulsion System
Main Parachute Support System
Material Review Board
Mission Safety Evaluation
Millisecond
Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Trowellable Ablator No. 2
MiUivolt
Nitrogen Tetroxide
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
Oxygen
Operational Instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operations and Maintenance Requirements Specification
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Processing Facility
Orbiter Program Office
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Orbiter
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter Vehicle
Ounce
Part Number
Primary Avionics Software System
Power Drive Unit
Primary Landing Site
Power-On Reset
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (CONT.)
ppm
PRACA
PRCB
psi
psi/hr
psia
psig
PST
QD
RCN
RCS
RGA
RH
RI
RM
RMS
RPC
RSD
RSRM
RSS
RTG
RTLS
RTV
S/N
S&A
scfm
scim
sec
SII
SIP
SOFI
SR&QA
SRB
SRBTS
SRM
SSC
SSME
SSRP
SSV
Parts Per Million
Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
Program Requirements Control Board
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch/Hour
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Pacific Standard Time
Quick Disconnect
Requirements Change Notice
Reaction Control System
Rate Gyro Assembly
Right-Hand
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Remote Manipulator System
Remote Power Controller
Range Safety Distributor
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Range Safety System
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Return to Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizate
Serial Number
Safe & Arm
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute
Second
SRM Ignition Initiator
Strain Isolator Pad
Spray-On Foam Insulation
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Beacon Tracking System
Solid Rocket Motor
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Space Shuttle Vehicle
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (CONT.)
STS
SUBS
TAL
TCTI
TEM
TPS
TPTA
TVC
USBI
VAB
VAC
VSWR
WSB
WSMR
WSTF
WWMS
°/sec
Space Transportation System
Subsequent
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Time Compliance Technical Instruction
Test and Evaluation Motor
Thermal Protection System
Transient Pressure Test Article
Thrust Vector Control
United Space Boosters, Inc.
Vehicle Assembly Building
Volts Alternating Current
Voltage Standing Wave Ratio
Water Spray Boiler
White Sands Missile Range
White Sands Test Facility
Waste Water Management System
Degrees/Second
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